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Wyclif and Lollardy 
Stephen Lahey 
John Wyclif’s place in the history of Christian ideas varies according to the historian’s 
interest. As scholastic theology, Wyclif’s thought appears an heretical epilogue to the 
glories of the systematic innovations of the thirteenth century. Historians of the Prot-
estantism, on the other hand, characterize him as a pioneer, the “Morning Star of the 
Reformation,” acknowledging his theology and the Lollard and Hussite movements 
associated with it as forerunners of sixteenth- century change. It has been difficult to 
understand Wyclif as a man of his age because the late fourteenth century itself is easily 
viewed as a period of transition from “Late Medieval” to “Early Modern.” Recent schol-
arship has helped to change this by showing how the decline of systematic Thomism 
and Scotism, the developing Ockhamist Moderni movement, and a vibrant Augustin-
ianism contributed to form an atmosphere in which Wyclif’s theological innovations 
were a recognizable, albeit unorthodox, expression of the period. The beginning of the 
fourteenth century saw a shift in the practice of theology, from the magisterial Summa 
to an interest in terminist analysis of specific theological problems. Theology had be-
come “mathematized,” reduced to a set of problems soluble through examination of the 
concepts involved.1 Ockham’s Moderni movement is most associated with this method-
ological shift, and most theologians of the period, whether philosophical Ockhamists or 
not, embraced it. Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham are among the best-known ana-
lysts of terms, concepts, and propositions associated with understanding the divine na-
ture and attributes, and the psychological elements of human willing, loving, and en-
joyment relevant to merit and grace, among other problems. 
Ockham’s approach to the thorny problem of divine foreknowledge and future con-
tingents is particularly significant for understanding later fourteenth-century theolog-
ical controversy. Ockham believed his account of divinely known future contingent 
truths preserved the contingency of the future action without detracting from God’s 
perfect knowledge; further, he argued that the human will was capable of actively elic-
iting its enjoyment of God above all things. If our will achieves this through its own 
agency, independently of God’s foregoing causal knowledge, critics responded, the Pe-
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lagian heresy in which one can merit grace through one’s works is resurrected.2 The 
most notable of these critics was the Mertonian Thomas Bradwardine, whose De Causa 
Dei argues that God predestines all created action, including all human willing; no one 
can will without God having eternally willed that they will as they do.3 
Bradwardine’s determinist position is important not only because of its effect on 
academic treatments of merit, grace, and the future contingents problem into the 
sixteenth century; it also highlighted a revival of Augustinianism at Oxford that 
achieved its fullest expression in Wyclif’s thought. The Paris condemnations of 1277 
had set the stage for an increase of interest in orthodox Augustinian theology, and 
theologians of the following years like Gregory of Rimini emphasized the need for 
faithfulness to Augustine’s writings over Moderni innovation. In Oxford, Uthred of 
Bolton had formulated a position redolent of the controversial Pelagianism, and Ri-
mini’s disciple John Klenkok imported the new Augustinianism into England to com-
bat Uthred. The influence of the Augustinian, or “Austin,” friars in Oxford was in-
strumental in helping to transport Augustinianism across the channel, particularly 
in the form of arguments specifying the need for grace for any just exercise of au-
thority.4 Giles of Rome’s papalist De Ecclesiastica Potestate was the first to formulate 
this thesis, and effectively denned the new Augustinianism. Giles’s arguments were 
particularly appealing to the Irish scholar Richard Fitzralph, whose De Pauperie Sal-
vatoris responded to Franciscan Minorites using Giles’s contention that grace alone 
justifies authority, in this case, over temporal goods. Fitzralph’s innovation was to 
introduce the term dominium to the discussion, making grace-founded dominium an 
important concept in mid-fourteenth- century Oxford.5 By mid-century, despite the 
depredations of Black Death, theological discourse at Oxford was lively, enriched by 
Bradwardine’s determinism and Fitzralph’s Augustinianism; scholars like Richard 
Brinkley, Thomas Buckingham, and Peter of Candia enjoyed an atmosphere in which 
philosophically innovative Augustinian theology could flourish. 
Wyclif arrived at Oxford from Yorkshire in the 1350s, and following an education 
in the systematic theology of Thomism, Scotism, and the new learning of the Mod-
erni, he rose to become Master of Balliol College and his generation’s foremost logi-
cian and realist metaphysician.6 He began theological studies in 1363, and was or-
dained six years later. As was then common for ordained scholars, he held benefices 
in Lincolnshire, Buckinghamshire, and Gloucestershire while at Oxford, until 1381, 
when he retired to Ludgershall, Leicestershire, where he died in 1384. While these 
facts suggest a placid life as scholar and rector, events in Wyclif’s life and his own 
inability to accept compromise on the priest’s ecclesiastical responsibilities led to a 
tumultuous career. He entered the service of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, in 
1372, representing the Crown at negotiations with papal nuncios in Bruges in 1374, 
and supported Gaunt in parliamentary disputes in 1376 and in the Hauley-Shakyll 
incident in 1378. Shortly after he began his royal service, Wyclif decided that he was 
obliged to turn from metaphysics to more practical matters. “It is time for me to give 
the rest of my life to matters as much speculative as practical, according to the capac-
ity that God has given.”7 So his writings shifted from the academic pursuits of pure 
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logic and metaphysics to the need for ecclesiastical reform, the right relation of secu-
lar to sacred authority, to issues of fraternal and papal responsibilities, Scriptural in-
terpretation, and the Eucharist.8 
Wyclif’s earlier writings on the need for royal divestment and control of the Eng-
lish Church earned him lasting ecclesiastical antipathy. In 1377 Bishop William 
Courtenay attempted formally to confront Wyclif but was foiled by popular unrest. 
Shortly thereafter Gregory XI demanded Wyclif’s arrest and examination, and Cour-
tenay attempted again in 1382 to force Wyclif into submission at Blackfriars, where 24 
propositions characterizing Wyclif’s ecclesiology were condemned as heresy. In each 
instance, the Duke of Lancaster’s protection ensured Wyclif safety in what would oth-
erwise have been life-threatening confrontations.9 The Council of Constance declared 
Wyclif an heresiarch in 1415, unjustly condemned and burned the Bohemian Jan 
Hus for having espoused Wyclifism, and ordered Wyclif’s remains to be exhumed, 
burned, and thrown into the river Swift. Connections between Wyclif’s realist meta-
physics and his ecclesiological ideas were sufficiently evident to scholars in Prague to 
prompt them to embrace his ecclesiology after having accepted his ontology, which 
played an important role in the tumultuous Hussite rebellion of the fifteenth cen-
tury. Following Constance and the defeat of the Hussites, there were no significant 
instances of this realism again in the scholastic tradition. 
Most twentieth-century scholarship of Wyclif’s theology has been predicated on 
the influence of his earlier philosophical writings on his later, more practical the-
ology.10 Indeed, throughout his logical and metaphysical treatises one occasion-
ally catches glimpses of Wyclif’s mounting frustration with the state of the Church, 
while his formal philosophy undergirds many of the arguments of the later trea-
tises, occasionally resurfacing in his arguments for the need of logical training in 
interpreting Scripture and understanding the Eucharist. While Wyclif did not dis-
agree with Ockhamism on many points, including sensitivity to the relation of lan-
guage to thought and to extralinguistic reality, he adamantly rejected Ockham’s de-
nial of the existence of universals outside the mind. In fact, he felt that advocacy of 
such a spare ontology contributed to society’s downfall. “Thus, beyond doubt, in-
tellectual and emotional error about universals is the cause of all the sin that reigns 
in the world.”11 Wyclif contended that God knows creation primarily through uni-
versals and only secondarily as individual creatures. This need not entail the exis-
tence of some realm of universals apart from divine and created being; universals 
exist primarily in God as second intentional concepts and secondarily in created es-
sences as first intentional concepts.12 
While Wyclif accepted the reality of traditional universals like genus and species 
and so on that had been introduced to scholasticism by Boethius and disputed in the 
schools for centuries beforehand, he departed from contemporary realists like Wal-
ter Burley and Gregory of Rimini by arguing that universals are the foundation for 
relations as well. Thus, any relation holding between creatures has a reality beyond 
the creatures themselves; its being is founded in God’s conception of the paradigm 
of that relation.13 Hence, Adam’s paternity relation to the rest of humanity is real 
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through God’s conception of paternity as such and its connection to Adam’s being as 
the first instantiation of the species Man. In this sense, Wyclif explains, all mankind 
existed potentially in Adam by virtue of his causal priority as the first father. This is 
a radical departure from the Aristotelian understanding of relations, and was to have 
important consequences for Wyclif’s conception of the Church and of human domin-
ion in creation. Certainly the most obvious consequence has to do with salvation; if 
some will be saved and others damned at judgment, some will have a relation of “jus-
tification through grace” to their Creator that others will lack. And while the “justi-
fication” relation is a consequence of how the saved act, it has reality by virtue of 
God’s understanding of justification and who will enjoy it. “The entire species of man 
is complete through God’s mediation, and … the multitude of the predestined are 
one genus, whose principle is the celestial Adam [Christ], while all the damned are 
a lesser generation, whose father and prince is the devil.”14 As a result, Wyclif’s rela-
tional realism involves a deterministic theology evocative of and reliant upon Brad-
wardine’s anti-Pelagianism. 
Bradwardine held that God’s perfect foreknowledge and omnipotence meant 
that every created action is directly caused by God’s participation in the activity. 
Indeed, Bradwardine held that this coeffiency of activity extends to cases of human 
sin; here. God’s moving causal primacy is as much a cause of the mechanics of the 
physical act of the sin as is the sinning agent. Only the sinner’s will acts alone, al-
though in any case in which the created agent wills the good. God’s causal power 
moves along with the agent’s willing, and is the reason why it is good.15 Wyclif felt 
that Bradwardine’s position could too easily be taken to eliminate the possibility 
of merit and demerit in human activity, suggesting that clarity about the necessity 
with which God foreknows future events dispels theological error.16 The means by 
which Wyclif addresses this determinism is distinguishing between the kind of ne-
cessity by which God knows who will be saved and the kind of necessity of truths 
not dependent upon created action, like mathematical or definitional truth. That 
God necessarily knows who will be among the saved is undeniable, but a conse-
quence of the activity of created wills. 
This could suggest that God’s knowledge is caused by created events, compromis-
ing the divine essence’s perfection. Wyclif hastens to distinguish between the way 
in which our knowledge is causally reliant upon and temporally consequent to cre-
ated action, and the way in which divine knowledge is eternal, and so neither tem-
porally consequent to, nor causally reliant upon, temporal events. That we will freely, 
God eternally wills with absolute necessity, but how we will is only hypothetically 
necessary. Although God eternally knows, and wills, that I will X at a given time, I 
might have willed otherwise then, in which case it would have been absolutely neces-
sary that God know and will that I will otherwise. Our action only has causal power 
over eternal knowledge after the fact; there is no reduction in God’s power, because 
as eternal knower God is prior ontologically to creation. So while there is a sense in 
which our action “causes” divine knowledge, that sense does not entail contingency 
in the divine nature.17 
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Wyclif’s metaphysical realism about relations is important not only because it 
illustrates how Wyclif’s thought diverges from Bradwardine’s, but also because it 
provides the theoretical framework on which his ecclesiology rests. Two conclusions 
follow from it. First, God knows who are the Elect, predestined for salvation, and 
so the real members of Christ’s earthly body. This means that the true Church is the 
congregation of the Elect, free of sin and favored by grace through Christ’s redemp-
tion to live the ideal life. Anyone tainted by sin claiming membership in the church 
must be an imposter, and anyone so stained claiming ecclesiastical authority must 
forcibly be stopped. Second, every just action for which we are responsible is an in-
stantiation of God’s justice, and every law- grounded relation we enjoy is only a real 
relation through divine law. These two concepts lead directly to Wyclif’s indictment 
of the existing Church’s hunger for secular authority, to his insistence on the need 
for clerical reform and for royal divestment of Church property, and to his conten-
tion that Scripture must be available in the vernacular for the proper instruction of 
the Elect on earth. 
Wyclif’s conception of the Church’s identity is the foundation of his ecclesiolog-
ical program. “The holy doctors are in agreement stating that all the elect are, from 
the beginning of the world to the day of judgement, one person which is the mother 
Church.”18 This definition of the true Church as the congregation of the Elect causes 
some problems, notably in determining exactly who are saved, and who are damned. 
That it is impossible to know who is predestined, Wyclif explains, should help us rec-
ognize that Church membership is no basis for claims of earthly authority. “With-
out a special revelation, no one should assert that he is predestined, and similarly, he 
should not assert that he is a member of the Church, or for that matter, its head.”19 
It follows that, if the Church is the congregation of the elect, whose identity re-
mains unknown in this life, the need for clerical authority is likely to be decreased, 
if not eliminated altogether. It is tempting to interpret Wyclif as having endorsed the 
abolition of the priesthood altogether, given his claim that “all the predestined are at 
once kings and priests.”20 While this could follow from his definition of the Church, 
Wyclif explains that the Church has need of a class of “evangelical lords” who in-
struct Christians by teaching and exemplifying lex Christi. There is need for a cler-
ical hierarchy of authority, however; bishops are useful primarily to prevent cleri-
cal abuse of authority, while the pope can serve as spiritual exemplar for the entire 
Church. The existing papal machinery of ecclesiastical control is an abomination, ex-
isting to attain and maintain the mundane power inimical to the priestly office. The 
arguments papalists present to justify this authority are without Scriptural founda-
tion. Where in the Petrine commission is anything said of special powers of the abso-
lution of sin or excommunication granted to some of Christ’s servants but not to oth-
ers? “How dare anyone say that he alone has the singular power of absolving any 
sinner from punishment and blame?”21 Surely such authority is God’s alone to assign 
to as many as He will, without restriction. Nor is excommunication a tool for any-
one to trifle with for their own ends, “for it is certain that anyone sinning mortally 
excommunicates himself, that is, places himself outside the community of the faith-
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ful, and accordingly a minister of the church publishes that fact by denouncing the 
excommunicant and forbidding him from any communication with others in God’s 
name … [T]he Church today is without any foundation in pretending to excommuni-
cate to obtain temporal goods; neither the apostles nor any of Christ’s disciples knew 
that sort of power; rather than scandalize the church by demanding even the neces-
sities of life, … they would endure hunger, thirst, and scant clothing, and would set 
themselvs to manual labor.”22 Throughout Wyclif’s works, he stresses that excommu-
nication is a matter between God and sinner, without need for clerical interference, 
that anyone claiming the authority to excommunicate pretends to divine authority, 
thereby indicating his or her own sinful state.23 
Priestly authority may be necessary for guidance, but when priests assume that the 
office allows its holders secular power, they confuse two kinds of law. The Church is 
defined by Christ’s law, which is exemplified by Christ’s life and illustrated by the 
purity of the early Church. Secular power is different from spiritual authority, and 
the law that serves as its foundation is grounded not in Christ’s life, but in original sin 
and the institution of private ownership, from which Christ’s law liberates us. Those 
who accept the responsibility of instructing others in Christ’s law are bound, Wyclif 
holds, to obey it scrupulously, to turn away from the world’s temptations not only to 
strengthen their own spiritual resolution but also to embody the Christian life. Of pri-
mary interest for Wyclif is the clergy’s tendency to use their authority to wield sec-
ular power, from papal claims of superiority over emperors and kings down to the 
lowliest priest’s claiming ownership of property. While anyone can rationalize a hun-
ger for temporal goods by pretending to be concerned for the Church, they should 
not fool themselves. “Because they have cold intentions towards temporal goods for 
which they strive, they are hypocrites, as abominable to God as the tepid water which 
causes vomiting.”24 
Property ownership is part of a concept that lies at the heart of Wyclif’s theology, 
dominium, which also includes jurisdiction and enforcing what is right. Dominium is 
the chief relation holding between Creator and creation, consequent upon God’s cre-
ative act, entailing His governance and sustenance of all things as well as His ulti-
mate authority in any action associated with ownership of creation, including giving, 
receiving, and lending any created thing. In fact, God’s dominium lies at the founda-
tion of anything in creation having the capacity to exercise any kind of power what-
ever. Recall that Wyclif held that all relations in creation are prefigured and ontolog-
ically reliant upon God’s being; the justice of any created being’s exercise of power is 
grounded in divine justice, and the actual exercise of that power is causally reliant on 
God’s willing that action. Hence, a creature’s having any capacity to give, receive, or 
lend, and to exercise jurisdiction or authority, is causally reliant upon, and prefigured 
by, God’s own dominium. In Aristotelian terms, any creature’s having, which Wyclif 
explains is the tenth category in Aristotle’s list of predicables, is reliant upon God’s 
antecedent having: “And the dominion of God … his lordship over every creature, is 
the principle of the final category.”25 So God’s dominium serves as a universal relation 
in which all created instances of dominium participate. 
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Wyclif describes God’s dominium in De Dominio Divino, the first major treatise he 
produced after having decided to turn his attentions to “more practical” matters. 
Here he explains that God’s dominium is the “standard and presupposition” for all re-
lations involving jurisdiction or ownership in creation, including the natural lordship 
mankind enjoyed before the Fall, the evangelical lordship exercised by priests, and 
the coercive, civil lordship that characterizes secular power. “The lordship of God is 
the measure, as prior and presuppositum, of every other [lordship] assigned; if one 
creature has lordship over another. God has prior lordship over it, so any created 
lordship follows upon God’s lordship, and not otherwise.”26 In keeping with his re-
alist metaphysics, Wyclif explains that God’s dominium over creation is secondary to 
His dominium over the universals that provide its order and structure. This means 
that God knows and has authority over humanity as such before having it over in-
dividual people. And since God’s dominium is the paradigm for all created instances 
of lordship, it follows that dominium as such is ideally over whole classes of things, 
rather than over individual objects.27 
That the concept has come to mean the exercise of authority and ownership over 
particular things in the world illustrates how man’s understanding has been weak-
ened by sin. As created, Wyclif explains, man enjoyed true dominium over creation, 
and the lordship Adam exercised was a true instantiation of, and participation in. 
God’s dominium. Characterizing this natural dominium was the absence of distinction 
between lord and subject as we have come to understand it; natural lords were as 
much servants as lords, because “all men have a dual nature, both elements of which, 
namely body and soul, serve the other in serving themselves, and they serve the just 
if the man is in a state of grace. Accordingly any man is corporally subservient to his 
spirit, and spiritually subservient to that of his brother, so he is at once lord and ser-
vant.”28 Any human being was a lord as much as subject in prelapsarian natural domi-
nium, because nobody had a will bent on serving itself to the exclusion of God; thus, 
distinctions of “mine” and “thine” were foreign before the Fall. “Natural dominium 
extends across the entire world: heaven, earth, and the universe in which the heav-
ens are contained … [it] requires no solicitude or looking after by any secular lord, 
janitor, or lesser minister,. . . [it] is not eradicable from human nature, despite the ob-
stacles of sin.”29 The stamp of natural lordship remains with us even if the innocence 
in which we exercise it is lost, by virtue of the ideal exemplar humanity by which we 
have our being and are known primarily by God. 
Sin destroyed man’s capacity for natural dominium by introducing the illusion of 
exclusive ownership, in which one selfishly assumes exclusive control of property. 
Since creation alone is the foundation for such exclusive ownership, and only God 
creates, this supposition is grounded in illusion. To claim unrestricted authority over 
what someone else has brought into being is to suppose that the other agent is capa-
ble of giving over absolute control of the object. But, Wyclif explains, it is impossible 
to abdicate dominium in this sense; bringing something into being entails remaining 
responsible for it throughout its being. The requirement of creation as necessary con-
dition for ownership is based securely in Wyclif’s philosophical theology, in which 
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“God produces all works most principally, most immediately, and most exclusively 
… creatures do nothing unless previously motivated through and helped by God’s 
movement.”30 When God gives to us, He never loses control over the gift; God keeps 
all of creation in being, so what God gives remains to a real extent God’s. “Because 
God is omnipotent and His multiple creation is required by any creature, it follows 
that He cannot alienate through giving any of His gifts because of the plenitude of 
His dominion.”31 
Private property ownership is a fiction founded on the belief that God can abdi-
cate His dominium over the owned sufficiently to allow the owner real control over 
it. Wyclif was certainly not the first to have suggested this; his theory of ownership 
is heavily reliant on the literature of the Franciscan Poverty Controversy, and dis-
tinctions between ownership, possession, and various kinds of use were fully de-
veloped in William Ockham’s Opus Nonaginta Dierum and in Richard Fitzralph’s De 
Pauperie Salvatoris. Wyclif’s understanding of the ultimate impossibility of exclusive 
property ownership among men and of the consequential artificiality of postlapsar-
ian civil dominium is reliant on Fitzralph’s treatise, in places so much so that critics 
have accused him of having cribbed from Fitzralph. While there is no question that 
Wyclif made use of Fitzralph, the results of his incorporation of Fitzralph’s concep-
tion of dominium into his own philosophical theology are sufficiently original to rule 
out this accusation. 
Until Christ’s coming, the specter of property ownership eliminated any possi-
bility of man’s serving God as a natural lord. God would never deprive the just of 
any gift without recompense, and Wyclif argues that those made righteous through 
Christ’s redemption and His institution of lex Christi regain the lost natural dominium 
by living in the apostolic purity of evangelical dominium. “Man in a state of innocence 
had lordship over every part of the sensible world, and the virtue of the passion of 
Christ is [the basis] for righteous remission of all sins and for restitution of lordship, 
so the temporal recipients of grace have justly complete universal lordship.”32 Christ 
lived a communal life with the apostles, sharing everything in the caritas of His sinless 
nature, and those who follow His example, realizing through grace the restored car-
itas of apostolic purity, regain the natural lordship now called evangelical dominium. 
“For all men coexisting in caritas on this side of Christ communicate in the things 
over which they exercise lordship … since all members of the church hold unmediat-
edly their lordship from Christ their chief lord, which I call natural, evangelical, orig-
inal, or grace-endowed lordship … restored by the gospel, beyond which any super-
added lordship would be superfluous.”33 
It is difficult at this point to see why Wyclif would later attack the friars so vehe-
mently, given the obvious similarities uniting his ideal of evangelical surrender of civil 
lordship and the mendicant ideal defended by Michael of Cesena, Ockham, and others. 
The theoretical seeds for his later indictment of the friars lie in Wyclif’s distinction be-
tween St. Francis’s ideal and Christ’s: followers of Francis are called Franciscans, while 
followers of Jesus Christ are not “Jesuans,” reliant upon the rule of a man, but Chris-
tians. In an order instituted by man, obedience of the rule may or may not be a nec-
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essary condition for grace, while a life faithful in Christ, a divinely-instituted ideal, is 
needed to receive grace. Franciscans follow a rule constructed by a man, while Chris-
tians live by Christ’s divinely appointed law.34 So long as the friars argue that Chris-
tians ought to surrender civil ownership to enjoy apostolic purity, they are correct, but 
when they suppose that their Order is the foundation for the righteousness of this pu-
rity, they err grievously. Wyclif’s later writings became increasingly directed against 
the Friars, whom he nicknamed “Caim,” an acronym referring to Carmelites, Augus-
tinians, Dominicans (Jacobites), and Franciscans (Minorites). In the Trialogus Wyclif 
outlines the six chief evils perpetrated by the mendicant orders. They oppress Chris-
tians with the burden of their physical needs and the greedy prices they charge for 
their services as confessors, they avoid labor, they sully Christ’s law with impertinent 
additions that benefit themselves, they ignore the rebukes of non-friars, they hunger 
for wealth and worldly honor, and “what is worst of all, they seduce to their ruin in 
spiritual things those of the people who rashly put their faith in them.”35 Many of the 
shorter Latin pieces of Wyclif’s later life are directed against the friars, as are a consid-
erable number of the vernacular tracts attributed to him.36 
We must not suppose that lacking private ownership is all that is needed to re-
gain our lost birthright. There have always been poor people, but their suffering does 
not mean they live in the righteous state of prelapsarian man. The poverty character-
izing evangelical dominium is a state of one’s spirit, and not only a matter of having 
or not having things. “Evangelical poverty has nothing to do with the possession of 
temporal goods, but [is a] mode of caring having, which augments wealth neither by 
increasing nor by taking away from it, just as on the other hand it neither augments 
nor decreases a privation of goods.”37 Evangelical dominium is so different from the 
civil dominium resulting from sin that defining it must not take civil elements into 
consideration. 
The doctrine of natural dominium restored through Christ’s redemption of origi-
nal sin provides the basis for Wyclif’s demand that all priests live in apostolic pov-
erty and humility, removed from the taint of private property and secular authority, 
and for his contention that the king ought to bring this about through divestment of 
ecclesiastical authority and property. It would appear that the justification for royal 
control of the Church is precluded by Wyclif’s rejection of the justice of civil domi-
nium, how can someone be sufficiently righteous to cleanse the Church when he em-
bodies the institution caused by original sin? Had Wyclif desired, he might have ar-
gued as Marsilius had, for a complete separation of the two realms of Church and 
State, with secular authority having total control over all temporal goods. This was 
certainly how Gregory XI interpreted Wyclif, for the bulls condemning De Civili Do-
minio accuse it of Marsilianism. 
Wyclif differs importantly from Marsilius, though, because his political theory is 
nested in his theology. The justice of civil rule is only real through participation in di-
vine justice; De Civili Dominio begins with the motto “Divine justice is presupposed 
by civil justice; Natural lordship is presupposed by civil lordship.”38 Wyclif’s idea is 
that a just civil lord is just through grace, since, as he had argued in his philosophical 
theology. God’s will is the primary cause of a given individual’s acting justly. Thus it 
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is possible for someone to exercise proprietative and jurisdictive authority with God’s 
justice, but only if he is eternally foreknown to be among the Elect favored by grace. 
A just king, then, is first and foremost a member of the Church, but one who is not 
free to abandon the cares of civil ownership. His place is to serve as God’s minister in 
the postlapsarian world, a steward of temporal goods acting as a human lord on be-
half of the interests of the divine lord. 
Since the king is the minister of God, according to the correspondent eminence of vir-
tue, it is clear that he should rule following the divine law by which the people are 
ordered. Since it is the part of justice to decline from evil and to do good, the king 
should coerce rebels against divine law and other authorities, and advance the fac-
tors of justice according to the laws of caritas. The king should have the power of 
ministratively ruling his subjects from God, and not by human law lacking divine 
sanction.39 
Wyclif’s just king is the central aspect of a political theory that emerges from his 
ecclesiology, and is better understood as a follower of lex Christi shouldering the re-
sponsibilities of postlapsarian life on behalf of the other evangelical lords than as a 
secular officeholder.40 That priests have come to embrace the secular encumbrances 
from which Christ freed His flock is the greatest threat now facing the Church, and 
should be the king’s chief concern. This is because the king is as much Christ’s vicar 
as any bishop is, realizing Christ’s divinity to exercise dominium over physical goods 
just as prelates realize Christ’s humanity to exercise a different kind of dominium over 
spiritual affairs. 
It is right for God to have two vicars in His church; namely a king in temporal affairs, 
and a priest in spiritual. The king should strongly check rebellion as did God in the 
Old Testament. Priests ought minister the precepts mildly, in a humble manner, just 
as Christ did. Who was at once priest and king.41 
The cancer of private property ownership and its attendant hunger for secular au-
thority was introduced into the Church by the Donation of Constantine, Wyclif ex-
plains, and can be purged only by a grace-endowed civil lord using his office as God 
intends to protect the Church from its own sin. Ideally, the Church would be noth-
ing more than an apostolic community enjoying the purity of evangelical poverty, 
but circumstances require the intercession of secular authority. “It would be best for 
the Church to be ruled wholly by non-avaricious successors of the apostles following 
the rule of Christ; less good would be a regime mixed through with co-active secular 
civil powers and lords, but worst of all is when prelates rule who are immersed in the 
worries and cares of civil lords.”42 
The place of the evangelical lord is to serve as God’s steward in spiritual con-
cerns, just as the civil lord serves God in temporal matters. Evangelical dominium 
is the fullest realization of the natural dominium mankind lost with the Fall, and the 
evangelical lord is entrusted with the care for that which is most valuable in cre-
ation, the spiritual reality that undergirds earthly life. The Church as Christ’s living 
presence in the world is the vehicle by which this responsibility is carried out, and 
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those entrusted with it must focus their whole lives upon it. Priests are most pre-
cisely the stewards of Christ’s body, and “must give themselves in their service by 
promulgating, working, and manifesting such that they glorify God through their 
continued actions, taking this service upon themselves in humility.”43 These spiri-
tual shepherds must lead their flock by embodying the caritas made possible by an 
apostolic life devoted to Christ’s law. “The pastor must instruct his charges through 
virtuous works so that they might live their faith as he does.”44 Accordingly, an 
evangelical lord living a vicious life fails to instruct his charges, ignoring his duties 
as God’s spiritual steward. And because of the exalted nature of spiritual author-
ity, this kind of failure is far more onerous than secular tyranny or some more mun-
dane transgression; the dignity of the office, and of the giver of the office, is defiled 
by an evangelical lord’s turning from his spiritual responsibilities, warranting re-
dress far more than does material iniquity. 
The history of the Church embodies this failure. Initially the Church lived the ideal 
life of apostolic purity and poverty that had been revealed through Christ’s teach-
ings and exemplary life, but the Donation of Constantine destroyed any possibility 
that this would continue on an institutional level. The Church had become yet an-
other secular organ, “perverted by temporal affairs from the honor of caritas, as prod-
igal in rich ornament as civil and secular lordship, prone to more richness in food, 
families, and clothing … than the secular laity.”45 This wealth of material possessions 
makes evangelical lords incapable of the spiritual purity required by their office. “As 
one overburdened with a multiplicity of clothing is thereby oftentimes rendered un-
fit for travel, so the man who is burdened with things temporal is often made less ca-
pable of serving the Church.”46 Wyclif frequently refers to material possessions as 
the vilest elements in the church, “the dung of the mystical body of Christ,” contend-
ing that nullification of the Donation and the divestment of ecclesiastical office of all 
material authority are the only means by which evangelical lords will be cleansed of 
this filth.47 If the well-being of the Church requires using material things, he suggests, 
then let it be sustained by alms provided by the grace-favored civil lords. The eccle-
siastical industry presently thriving on this dungheap, the selling of benefices and in-
dulgences, and the proliferation of canon law, a perverse monster created by grafting 
secular juridical practices onto the living body of lex Christi, all must be obliterated 
for the Church to realize its true identity. Then, Wyclif contends, the church will be 
able to instruct mankind through its exemplary caritas, and the war and confusion 
that now troubles the world will die away. 
If, according to the Old Testament, it is licit and obligatory to remove a yoke that 
weights down a neighbor’s mule, much more so in the New Law should a broth-
er’s soul not be burdened by the weight of so-called alms by which Christ’s religion 
is lost and dragged to the lower depths by the devil’s snare; and in these matters, we 
ought not to trust the appetites of sick men who have embraced in their need dung-
heaps in the Pauline sense. If, therefore, temporal possessions are necessary for us, 
let them be given to us according to the manner and measure the Gospel has deter-
mined; for then temporal possessions will be dispersed in the world as fruitfully as 
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the rains, and dissensions and wars and sects and other fruits of the flesh that the 
Apostle mentions will be laid to rest, and the word of God will enter ….48 
Our source for understanding Christ’s law is Holy Scripture, which is the source 
not only of all order in the Church, but the special link between the eternal logic of 
the Ideas understood by God and any understanding possible in the human mind. 
If Wyclif’s name is remembered at all in common parlance, it is as the first to have 
translated the Bible into the English language; however, contemporary scholars sug-
gest that the Wyclif Bibles that have survived are likely not to have been the products 
of Wyclif’s own translating efforts, but the work of his disciples. This does not dimin-
ish Wyclif’s importance in the history of the place of Scripture in Christian theology, 
though; his theory of Scriptural interpretation was one of the key elements of the Lol-
lard and Hussite movements, and remains a landmark of late medieval philosophical 
theology. 
Augustine had long ago urged the primacy of Scriptural authority above all other 
sources of knowledge, and had argued that cases in which Scripture appeared to fly 
in the face of reason demanded greater perspicacity in Scriptural interpretation. What 
had changed by the late fourteenth century was the depth of logical analysis to which 
Scripture might be subjected; throughout Wyclif’s works on understanding the Bi-
ble, he rails against those who would use new-fangled logical tools to demonstrate 
the incompatibility of cold, clear Aristotelian reason with revealed truth. Every truth, 
however it might appear to conflict with Scripture, must be, if it is indeed true, found 
primarily in Holy Scripture. This, Wyclif contended, is because Scripture is the em-
bodiment of the eternal logic of divine understanding, the source of all truth. Since 
God’s knowing a thing to be true is that by which the thing is true, and since Scrip-
ture is the primary source of every truth in creation, “all law, all philosophy, all logic 
and all ethics is in Holy Scripture”; if our reason judges something to be so, the foun-
dation for that judgment must rest in Scripture primarily, and only secondarily in the 
operation of created reason.49 
Wyclif had early on argued that Augustine’s call for a careful interpretation of 
Scripture required a sensitivity to the fundamental truths of logic, suggesting that too 
many logicians had confused means with ends, making logic appear incommensurate 
with studying Scripture.50 A careful student of the relation of terms to objects will 
recognize the primacy of the ontological nature of the object to the truth of the term, 
and correspondingly, the primacy of the universal to the particular nature. The Ock-
hamist logicians erred in supposing that universals play no part in the signification 
of terms, which led to a misunderstanding of the nature of truth. Following Grosse-
teste, Wyclif argues that a term or word’s signifying force is dependent upon its con-
formity to that which it signifies, and since the first and most primary universal signi-
fication is the Word’s embodiment of the eternal ideas known by God through which 
creation occurs. Thus, the duty of the student of Scripture is to begin with a recogni-
tion that the Word of God is the perfect expression of, and universal in which, all cre-
ated truths have their being.51 
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In fact, the nature of Holy Scripture realizes a universal-particular relation. Scrip-
ture has five levels of being, of which four have an ideal, universal status instantiated 
in the physical book. 
It has been my custom to list five degrees of sacred Scripture. The first is the Book of 
Life mentioned in Apocalypse 20 and 21. The second is the truths written in the Book 
of Life in their ideal being …. In the third sense Scripture means the truths which are 
to be believed in general, which, in their existence or effect, are written in the Book of 
Life. In the fourth sense Scripture means a truth to be believed as it is written in the 
natural book which is a man’s soul …. In the fifth sense, Scripture means the books or 
sounds or other artificial signs of truth.52 
The physical book is not the end of the relation; the active participation of the in-
dividual, believing reader engaging with the text is the final instantiation of the chain 
that begins with the ideal truths understood by God. What I truly understand when 
I read Scripture is my mind’s realization of an instantiation of the eternal Truth that 
makes use of the written medium of the Bible as a means. In fact, Wyclif holds that, as 
the source of all truth in creation, Scripture serves as the paradigm for any linguistic 
expression of the truth, and is the means by which God teaches man how to express 
all truth. “Scripture should be the exemplar of all types of human speaking, [since] 
it includes in itself every type of possible speech.”53 As with any other true relation. 
God’s willing the reality of the relation is necessary for the understanding that blos-
soms in my mind instantiating the universal eternal Word, which means that grace is 
necessary for successful Scriptural understanding.54 Thus Wyclif identifies two ele-
ments necessary for understanding the truth of Scripture: the most basic element, the 
movement of the Holy Ghost in the reader’s mind illuminating the eternal truth that 
Scripture embodies, and secondly, schooling in logic and grammar sufficient to aid 
the reader in understanding how the words in the Bible refer to eternal truths. With 
these two elements, a Christian reading Scripture has no need of “authoritative” in-
termediaries explaining how to understand the truth it contains. “The whole of Holy 
Scripture … is an infinitely greater authority than any other writings regarding its au-
thenticating the propriety of human authors … .”55 
Since Scripture is the first and final authority, it must be available to all seekers of 
truth. Certainly without ready access to Scripture justice will be impossible in society, 
as is salvation for anyone deprived of the living Word of God. 
It has been said that there should be a mirror of secular lords in the vulgar tongue 
by which they can rule in total conformity with the law of Christ... for Holy Scrip-
ture is the faith of the church and as much as it is plainly understood in the orthodox 
sense, so much for the better . . . Similarly because the truths of the faith are clearer 
and plainer in Scripture than the priests know how to express, since many priests … 
are ignorant of it while others conceal the points of Scripture which speak of humil-
ity and clerical poverty, it seems useful for the church that the faithful reveal this true 
sense … . In each language by which the Holy Ghost gives knowledge is the faith in 
Christ disclosed for the people.56 
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Wyclif’s belief that Scripture ought to be available in the vernacular, and the 
movement to translate it that followed, are not all for which Wyclif is commonly re-
membered. While it is easy to report Wyclif’s denial of transubstantiation occurring 
during celebration of the Eucharist, it is not so easy to understand the complexity un-
derlying his motivation for doing so. From one standpoint, Wyclif’s eventual rejec-
tion of transubstantiation, an explanation of Christ’s real presence at the Sacrament 
approved by Innocent III in 1215, can be explained as a rejection of the scholastic Ar-
istotelian accounts propounded by Aquinas and Scotus based on his philosophical 
rejection of their synthetic Aristotelianism.57 In this account, Wyclif the philosopher 
denies the possibility that the substance of the elements are annihilated at consecra-
tion because it demands that one act entail two simultaneous yet independent move-
ments: the bread ceases to be at the same instant and place that Christ’s body begins 
to be. Yet the schoolmen insist on calling this an act of conversion, which requires a 
subject in which the conversion occurs. What, Wyclif asks, is converted, if the bread’s 
substance is annihilated when Christ’s body begins? If one responds that the acci-
dents remain constant while the underlying substance shifts, then it appears that our 
sense perception, the foundation of our understanding of the material world, might 
never perceive things as they are. The certainty of natural knowledge would van-
ish; how would we know that the perceived object X is not some other object Y with 
the perceptible accidents of an X?58 If the answer is that some accident-like quantity 
causes the other accidents to remain constant in the absence of underlying substance, 
the problem still exists: in what do these accidents inhere? If something, it must be 
substantial according to Aristotelian ontology, but if not, then nothing is the subject 
of conversion. The explanation that Wyclif’s rejection of transubstantiation grows out 
of his metaphysics has been widely accepted, but frequently followed by a dissatis-
faction with the apparent vagueness of Wyclif’s alternative account of Christ’s real 
presence in the elements.59 
A different view is possible if one concentrates on Wyclif’s interest in redefining 
Christian authority through a reassessment of Scriptural hermeneutics. Throughout 
De Eucharistia Wyclif blasts “modern doctors” for having run roughshod over the dis-
tinction between the literal and figurative interpretations of Christ’s words. In too 
many cases theologians have twisted the ideas of the Evangelists and the Church Fa-
thers to benefit themselves, thereby creating a tendency amongst prelates to value 
the words, the signifiers, rather than the truths signified. Did not Paul, Augustine, 
Rhabanus, and John the Damascene indicate that the sacrament remained bread and 
wine while signifying Christ’s body and blood? This fixation with appearances rather 
than true underlying meanings is symptomatic of a priestly disease that manifests it-
self in other forms, including a hunger for material goods, for political power, and 
an aversion to spiritual discipline. What is sorely needed, Wyclif believes, is an ap-
proach to Scripture guided not by earthly concerns but by a prayerful seeking of eter-
nal truths. Attention to the fundaments of proper logical analysis of Scripture is fun-
damental here; its absence leads to undue emphasis placed on pilgrimage, the cult of 
relics, and transubstantiation, all merely signs of eternal truth, not true in themselves. 
Here Wyclif the Scriptural commentator and ecclesiastical reformer proves the abuse 
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of clerical authority through examination of the biblical foundation for transubstanti-
ation, making his redefinition of the Eucharist a vehicle through which his vision of a 
Church reborn can be realized. 
While this interpretation improves on the view that Wyclif’s eucharistic doctrine is 
primarily philosophically motivated, by incorporating other elements of his theolog-
ical vision, it requires a fuller understanding of his logic and philosophy of language 
than one might suppose. Underlying his arguments for correct interpretation of Scrip-
tural language and of the relation of sign to signifier is an assumption that his audi-
ence is familiar with formal scholastic linguistic analysis, including supposition theory, 
the nature of denomination, and similar concerns of the late fourteenth-century Oxford 
schoolman. Nor is Wyclif’s logic the only concern. Recently Heather Phillips has ar-
gued convincingly that Wyclif’s “remanence” theory, in which Christ’s being has spiri-
tual reality in the physical essence of the host, is best understood through an awareness 
of his interest in optics. Phillips explains that Wyclif’s alternative to transubstantiation 
incorporates the imagery of light and its refraction pioneered by Alhazen, Witelo, and 
Roger Bacon to explain how Christ’s being is wholly and really present in the host, just 
as an image is present in a mirror. While the object reflected is not itself substantially 
“in” the mirror, the mirror certainly undergoes a change such that the reflected object is 
really present in the mirror in a way that it is not when no reflection occurs. So it is with 
the Eucharist; while Christ is not substantially “in” the elements, they serve as mirror 
by which Christ’s being is really present in them when consecrated.60 
Wyclif’s thought serves as the foundation for many Lollard doctrines, although 
attempts to trace secure ties from surviving Lollard writings to particular elements 
of Wyclif’s thought are bound to be affected by the movement’s shift from formal 
academic circles to popular vernacular preaching and debate. Nevertheless, in each 
of the three general areas of Lollard ideology—theology, ecclesiology, and politics—
Wyclif’s theological influence is unmistakable. Lollardy, the popular English move-
ment rooted in Wyclif’s theology, is divisible into three distinct periods. In the first, 
the “Oxford period,” from 1378 to 1413, the fates of Wyclif, his writings, and the ca-
reers of important figures in Lollardy are closely associated. The movement was rec-
ognized as sufficiently threatening to warrant parliamentary authorization of the 
death penalty for its members in 1401, with the enactment of De Heretico Comburendo. 
In 1409, Archbishop Thomas Arundel issued the Constitutions, which in its attempt 
to stamp out Wyclifism restricted all public preaching to licensed representatives of 
the episcopal authority. In 1413, Sir John Oldcastle and other rebellious knights, all 
of whom identified themselves with general tenets of Lollardy, rose unsuccessfully 
against Henry V. 1415 proved a significant year for Lollardy, for Wyclif’s writings 
were formally condemned as heresy at the Council of Constance just as the doomed 
Oldcastle revolt marked Wyclif’s disciples as guilty of treason. From 1415 into the 
1560s, Lollardy was an underground movement associated with a host of anticlerical 
reformative preachers, firebrands, and common citizens situated largely in England’s 
northern counties. Thus, Lollardy was three things: at its inception, it was a move-
ment among scholars and students at Oxford, at which point it was heretical; it be-
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came a cause used by anti-Lancastrian knights, making it treasonous as well as heret-
ical; finally, it waned but remained as glowing embers among the people in the north 
country, at which point it was mainly heretical again.61 
Theologically, Lollardy embodies a reaction against much of the practice of late 
fourteenth-century Christianity. The cult of saints, the proliferation of clerical profit 
from administration of the sacraments, and a fondness for pilgrimage and image-
worship, drew the ire of preachers and believers inspired by the spirit of Wyclif’s re-
forming zeal. Underlying all Lollard theology was the conviction that Scripture alone 
provides the basis for legitimate Christian practice. “It is said often that we desire not 
that men believe us, unless we base ourselves in the faith or in the reason of God’s 
law. And then men believe us not because we say a thing, but because God says it—
and woe to him who then believes not!”62 One of later Lollardy’s greatest foes. Bishop 
Reginald Pecock, described the movement’s theology as poisoned by three connected 
misconceptions. 
No ordinance is to bind Christian men to the service of God save that it is grounded 
in the Holy Scripture of the New Testament … . That whatever Christian man or 
woman humble in spirit desiring true understanding of Holy Scripture shall without 
fail find [it] … wherever he or she shall read or study … and the more meek he or she 
shall be, the sooner he or she shall come into the true understanding of it... When-
ever a person has found the understanding of Holy Scripture … he or she ought turn 
away their hearing, reading, and understanding from all reasoning and arguing or 
proof which any cleric might make by any kind of evidence of reason or Scripture, 
and especially of reason, to the contrary.63 
Bound up in the sola scriptura theological orientation are virtually all of the ele-
ments of Lollard theology.64 While most Lollards did not deny the need for sacra-
ments to attain salvation, their extant writings describe a vehement reaction against 
ecclesiastical sacramental practices. Most easily recognizably Wyclifite among these is 
the Lollard denial of transubstantiation. Just as a man seeing a statue does not think 
first about its being of some kind of wood but thinks what the statue is meant to rep-
resent, suggests an early vernacular sermon, so someone considering the Eucharist 
should think of Christ, and not bread or wine, nor any metaphysical subtleties. Many 
Lollard texts rely heavily on the substance of De Eucharistia: “The bread of the sacred 
host is true bread in its nature, and is eaten physically, but it is God’s body figura-
tively …. This host is eaten physically and spiritually by some men, but Christ’s body 
in His nature is not physically eaten.”65 Some later Lollards even rejected the real 
presence of Christ, holding that the Eucharist was but a memorial of Christ’s passion, 
while other, more extreme individuals actively denigrated the sacrament; one Lol-
lard knight is said to have taken the host from his mouth and consumed it later with 
a dish of oysters. 
The other sacraments came under similar scrutiny, although the basis for criticism 
tended more towards Scriptural interpretation than metaphysical arguments. Various 
texts discuss the need for infant baptism, the possibility of marriage for clergy, and 
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the legitimacy of laymen hearing confession and absolving sins, in each case start-
ing with the possibility that Scripture allows for more freedom than contemporary 
Church practice admits. Typifying Lollard rejection of clerical profit from sacramental 
authority, many texts decry the contemporary traffic in indulgences with arguments 
that would prefigure Luther’s: how can the pope be truly charitable if he does not re-
lieve all suffering souls from the torments of purgatory? How can the pope justly 
release from purgation living supplicants who might well be eternally damned? To 
clerical arguments that money is asked to cover the physical costs incurred by the 
Church, “certainly a little lead costs many thousand pounds each year to our poor 
land … truly they deceive people and mock them, for they sell a fat goose for little or 
nought, but the garlic costs many shillings!”66 
Much that embodies late medieval Christian practice drew Wyclifite fire. Wyc-
lif had rejected prayers to individual saints as based in the confused belief that the 
saints have powers based in their own sanctity, apart somehow from divine giving.67 
Enthusiastic followers pursued this line of reasoning, resulting in iconoclastic occur-
rences like using the image of St. Katherine as fuel to cook supper and similar de-
struction of pictures, statues, and relics. Prayer as a whole underwent a serious re-
vision: Latin prayers spoken by non-Latin-speaking people were worthless, and the 
activity of a faithful life serves as a more effective prayer than any mere collection 
of words. Likewise, the practice of pilgrimage was criticized as but an opportunity 
for revelry and entertainment. True pilgrimage, these preachers suggested, involves 
giving alms to the poor and serving God faithfully in daily life; few Lollards would 
countenance the hijinks of Chaucer’s merry band. 
Lollard ecclesiology is recognizably a vernacular adumbration of Wyclif’s domi-
nium writings, based on the premise that the true Church is the congregation of the 
Elect. While Wyclif was clear that its true members were unknowable save by God, 
his Lollard disciples tended towards a variety of interpretations of this idea. Some 
followed Wyclif, holding the Church’s membership to be unknowable. The author of 
the Lanterne of Liyt, a well-known early Lollard text, expands on Wyclif’s definition, 
saying “The Church is not in men by power or spiritual or temporal dignity, for many 
princes and high bishops and others of lower degree … are found to be apostate …. 
The Church stands in those persons in whom is acknowledgement and true confes-
sion of faith and truth.”68 Others interpreted the membership to be the “holy saints of 
God,” “the congregation of just men for whom Jesus Christ shed his blood,” or “true 
Christian men and women.”69 The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these later 
definitions—that “true Christians” are recognizable as just, godly men and women—
is contrary to Wyclif’s idea, but dovetails neatly with the issue of whether priests 
who sin can minister to their flock. Here, Wyclif’s belief that clerics pursuing worldly 
goods or acting sinfully are not fit to serve as spiritual lords provided sufficient foun-
dation for his followers to embrace a Donatism that he had struggled to avoid. Ear-
lier Lollards followed Wyclif’s approach, arguing that “Antichrist’s sophisters should 
know well that a cursed man fully doth the sacraments, though it be to his damna-
tion, for they are not the authors of these sacraments, but God keepeth that dignity to 
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Himself.”70 Nevertheless, Donatism loomed over the development of Lollard concep-
tions of the priesthood, so that the Carmelite Thomas Netter was to identify Wycli-
fism with the heresy in his later Doctrinale Fidei Catholicae.71 
Wyclif’s sentiments towards the Church and its present state are echoed through-
out Lollard writings. Regarding the physical being of the Church, Wyclif’s opinions 
suggest later, Tudor innovations; in De Officio Regis he advises the king to dismantle 
the churches in times of national emergency and use the stones to build fortresses.72 
Similar attitudes surface in Lollard texts; one suggests that worship is “commonly 
better done in the air under heaven, but often in rainy weather, churches are good.”73 
His antipathy towards papal striving for political power surfaces repeatedly in Lol-
lard indictments of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. If there is any need for a chief spir-
itual lord, should he not embody Christ’s law in his person and actions? “God gave 
power to Peter being a good and holy man to bind and to loose, and to his succes-
sors who are as good as he was—and otherwise not.”74 Likewise, the Church’s crying 
need for reform must be addressed by the just civil lord as his chief duty, although 
some later Lollards surpassed their teacher in their zeal for reform by arguing that if 
the king be incapable of divesting the church of its wealth, then the duty falls to the 
common people.75 
While the impact Wyclif’s thought had on the theological landscape of the fif-
teenth century was significant, it is difficult to describe direct influence it might have 
had on the Lutheran movement of the early sixteenth century. Elements of Wyclif’s 
reformative vision certainly suggest Luther’s, notably the appeal for a “top-down” 
reform model in which the aristocracy takes responsibility for the Church’s reform, 
as well as the deterministic theology, the emphasis on the place of Scripture in the 
Christian’s daily life, the savage attacks on clerical abuse of power, and the rejection 
of transubstantiation. Yet Luther was in many senses a product of his schooling, and 
the Council’s condemnation of Wyclif in 1415 discouraged further formal academic 
pursuit of the philosophical theology that had germinated into Wyclifism.76 
Bohemia proved a more fertile ground for Wyclifism. Jan Hus, a professor and 
preacher at the university of Prague, began a theological movement based in Wyc-
lif’s thought that would grow into a nationalist crusade that would influence east-
ern Europe’s Christianity into the seventeenth century. In the early fifteenth cen-
tury, Prague intellectuals discovered Wyclif’s realism, which flew in the face of the 
nominalist thought universally accepted by German academics, and Czech intellec-
tuals eagerly embraced it as definitive of their Bohemian identity. While Hus was 
by no means foremost among Prague’s Wycliffites, he became familiar with Wyclif’s 
reformative ecclesiology and theology in pursuing his doctorate, and incorporated 
some of the English reformer’s revolutionary sentiment into his sermons.77 Hus’s 
De Ecclesia incorporates none of Wyclif’s dominium-centered philosophy and little 
of his antiproprietary theology into its argument, retaining primarily the argument 
that the Christian church is nothing more than the universal body of the predesti-
nate. While many of Hus’s arguments for clerical reform find their origin in Wyclif’s 
De Ecclesia and De Potestate Pape, the philosophical complexity that characterizes 
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Wyclif’s theology is absent. Arguments that Hus embodied a Bohemian incarnation 
of Wyclifism are overstated; at best, Hus used Wyclif’s thought as an inspiration.78 
Hus supported Utraquism, the belief that the communicant must take both bread 
and wine, but did not deny transubstantiation, as did Wyclif, and later reformers. 
While Luther’s exclamation on reading Hus’s De Ecclesia, “We are all Hussites with-
out knowing it,” is celebrated as evidence of Hus’s proto-reformation status, it is 
more accurate to view the treatise as the chief document of the Hussite revolution in 
fifteenth-century Bohemia. 
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